Congressional voting and trade

A project completed for Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs SIPAU6600 Testing Models of Public Policy.

View the Github Repo here.

The central question of this research is the following - what is the effect of greater import competition on congressional voting behaviour on legislation aimed at enhancing free trade? Secondarily, if there is any effect, it will be useful to understand how long it persists.

I find evidence that higher levels of exposure to import competition in congressional districts is associated with a lower propensity in members representing those districts to vote for free trade agreements, on average.

The effect is robust to a full set of controls when estimated with OLS and probit. I find evidence of an effect that persists from the 108th to the 112th Congress. Further, there is evidence of a partisan divide in the voting response, which is more strongly negative for Republicans.

The policy brief may be accessed here, along with presentation slides.